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Abstract   The purpose of this article is to consider under what circumstances it
is better to have centralised enforcement of catch quotas and when it is better to
leave enforcement to the countries themselves. It is shown for a two-country
case that a welfare gain is obtained under centralised enforcement at the federal
level. The result depends critically on the difference in the unit cost of enforce-
ment at the federal and the Member State (regional) level. If the Member States
have a sufficiently large cost advantage in enforcing quotas, they can be better
off under decentralised enforcement. In addition, the result depends on the pro-
portion of foreign fishermen in the domestic fishing zone. The higher the
proportion of foreign fishermen in the domestic zone, the better the
decentralised enforcement of quotas.
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JEL Classification  Codes   Q22, Q28.
Introduction
Despite the fact that the use of market solutions has increased in popularity in recent
years, a need to impose governmental regulation exists. The exploitation of natural
resources is an example of where markets are often absent (the common property
problem). To achieve efficient exploitation of the resources, governmental regula-
tory goals are set in situations such as the international exploitation of fish
resources. International agreements between states that exploit shared stocks are es-
sential in order to avoid depleted fish stocks and dissipated rents. This type of
international governance can be seen in the EU, where the regulation of fish quotas
is decided at the international level (the EU level). However, the success of an im-
posed management strategy depends on whether the regulatory agencies are willing
to spend sufficient money to catch and convict violators of regulations.
Further examples, including similar issues of centralised versus decentralised
governance, include the analysis of the Regional Fisheries Management
Organisations (RFMOs) in the context of high seas fisheries (Munro 2000). For
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these organisations, it is highly relevant to examine whether enforcement should be
at the individual country level or at the RFMO level.
The purpose of this article is to address management and enforcement from an
international perspective. This issue is relevant to the regulation of international
pollution control (Silva and Caplan 1997; Harford 2000), forestry management
(Clarke, Reed, and Shrestha 1993), and climate change enforcement (Chen 1997).
The essence of the problem is that the single states joining the agreement have no
incentive to apportion sufficient resources for monitoring and enforcement, and in a
sense the situation can often be described by the classic “tragedy of the commons”
problem (Hardin 1968).
The specific issue addressed in this article is to analyse the conditions under
which it would be optimal to use additional funds for a centralised enforcement of
the agreement. Centralised management is seen as an alternative to decentralised
agencies, which may conduct insufficient enforcement. In the present analysis, the
problem is considered in relation to the management of enforcement in the interna-
tional shared fishery in the EU. It specifically addresses whether the task of
enforcement and control can be conducted at a decentralised regional level, which
due to information advantages may be less costly.
We study the problem in a two-stage game setting. In the first stage, the
government(s) set their enforcement level, which has a direct impact on the prob-
ability of fishermen being caught illegally harvesting. In the second stage, fishermen
maximise their expected profits, taking into account the enforcement of the
government(s) and the actions of the other fishermen. We compare the cooperative
(EU) case to a non-cooperative case with two Member States. In the cooperative
case, only one central authority decides enforcement in the first stage. In the non-
cooperative case, the two countries solve their equilibrium enforcement level in the
first stage. In both cases, the fishermen play a non-cooperative game among them-
selves in the second stage.
For the two-country game, we make a distinction between two interesting spe-
cial cases where the proportion of domestic and foreign fishermen varies in the
domestic zone of the managing authority. We show how the proportion of foreign
fishermen may affect the equilibrium of the two countries. From the analytical re-
sults we provide a numerical example where we discuss issues such as cost
recovery. That is, we study whether the fishermen would be able to afford to partici-
pate in the enforcement costs that could guarantee more efficient harvesting.
Sutinen and Andersen (1985) have studied the enforcement of fish quotas in a
single-player model. Milliman (1986) has considered optimal enforcement in the
presence of costly enforcement and avoidance activities carried out to escape the de-
tection of illegal activities. Jensen and Vestergaard (2000) have studied the moral
hazard problem when individual catches are unobservable to society. Further,
Hatcher et al. (2000), Anderson and Lee (1986), and Kuperan and Sutinen (1998)
have studied the problems of enforcement and compliance in fisheries. Although
these examples show that there are many applications in the area of fisheries en-
forcement, to our knowledge no attempts have been made to construct a model with
an international perspective. The current article contributes to the literature by
analysing an enforcement game between two countries with a common fish stock.
The regulation of fisheries in the EU is described first. Second, we briefly de-
scribe the underlying Gordon-Schaefer model. Then the game with a single
controller is established. The following section extends the analysis by allowing
decentralised enforcement; that is, two countries. Simulations of these results are
then conducted. Finally, the results are discussed.Centralised vs. Decentralised Enforcement of Fish Quotas 155
The Management Problem of the European Union
As in most other fisheries around the world, an arsenal of different regulations is
employed in the EU fishery.1 However, the regulations have no influence on the effi-
ciency of the fishery if the fishermen neglect them. In this sense it is important that
the managing authority puts enough effort into monitoring and/or sets high enough pen-
alties to secure compliance. As the cost of monitoring the industry is significant, it is
reasonable that enforcement should be conducted at the most cost-efficient level (OECD
2003). On the other hand, it is important that the monitoring authority does not have
conflicting interests that lead to a control policy that is insufficient or discriminatory.
EU common regulations (e.g., the Total Allowable Catch [TAC]) are decided at
the EU level. However, quota decisions are also often affected by advice from ICES
(the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea), and in the case of shared
stocks, they may be decided together with other countries. The competence to moni-
tor regulations is typically placed at the level of the Member State.2 The
decentralised Member State level is presumably the most cost-efficient place to put
the competence of control. The reason is that the Member State’s authority has the
best knowledge of its own fishing industries, fishing gear, and seasonal fishing pat-
terns that are essential for detecting non-compliance.
Derivation of Sustainable Effort and Stock Levels
In this section, we briefly present the general model used in this article. The aim is
to show the relationship between steady-state fishing effort and stock levels.
We follow the Gordon-Schaefer model with a single stock of size. The change
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where the stock, x, is harvested by n fishermen of which n/2 belong to country 1 and
the other half to country 2. In this model, the discount rate is equal to zero, and
growth of fish, G(x), is given by the logistic growth function:
Gx r x x K () ( / ) , = − 1 (2)
where r is the intrinsic growth rate of fish and K is the carrying capacity. We have a
linear production function (harvest for fisherman i):
hq e x ii = . (3)
Here x is the stock, ei is fishing effort, and q is a catchability coefficient that is
equal for all fishermen.
1 That is TAC, bycatch regulations, technical measures, and so forth (see conservation regulation 3760/
92 and later amendments) (Official Journal of the European Communities L 389, 31.12 1992).
2 The role of the Commission is mainly to conduct on-the-spot inspections of the monitoring in the
Member States (see control regulation 2847/93 and later amendments) (Official Journal of the European
Communities L 261, 20.10 1993).Jensen and Lindroos 156




















We see that for each level of fishing effort there is a corresponding steady-state
stock level that can be sustained. For simplicity, we approximate the number of fish-
ermen by letting n approach infinity, which gives the open-access case. In
equilibrium there are thus no rents to be gained from the fishery.
Enforcement of the Fishery: The Case of a Single Central Authority (The EU)
In this section there is a single enforcing authority. The problem of the authority is
to decide the level of enforcement given that enforcement is costly. The fishermen’s
problem is to decide the optimal fishing effort level; they play a Nash game in the
exploitation of the fish resource. The fishery is managed by a TAC regulation. It is
assumed that the TAC is set at a sufficiently low level so that it restricts their fishing
effort. Without regulation in the fishery, the open-access solution, or in our case the
non-cooperative effort level, produces catches that exceed the TAC. This follows be-
cause it is not optimal for the central authority to choose perfect control since
control is costly.
The authority is assumed to maximise the economic surplus, πo, which is given














s.t. 0 ≤ Z ≤ 1.
The government decides the level of the enforcement effort, Z, based on the ob-
jective function (5), where the first term is the sum of gross national income in the
fishing sector denoted by Pi(o). The second term indicates the governmental costs,
which consist of the unit cost of enforcement, γ1, and the level of enforcement, Z.
Note that the enforcement cost function implies: (i) diminishing returns in terms
of enforcement effort with increasing expenditure and (ii) an infinite cost of perfect
compliance. We have chosen this particular functional form for tractability of the
model. It may well be that in some cases we would have to specify a very different
form of enforcement cost function. Further, if enforcement effort is zero, then we
still have a fixed management cost of the fishery worth γ1. The fixed part of the
management costs is due to, e.g., research costs.
The fishermen choose the level of fishing effort, ei, based on expected profit
maximisation:
E P ph ce h TAC ii i i i ()( ) . = −− − > 1 ΨΨ Ω if  (6)
The fishermen’s profit depends on whether they decide on a strategy of compli-
ance. The fishermen are assumed to be risk neutral. The expected returns underCentralised vs. Decentralised Enforcement of Fish Quotas 157
non-compliance are described in equation (6). The first term is the expected indi-
vidual income, where Ψ is the risk of being caught in non-compliance, h is the
quantity harvested, and price is the unit price of the harvest. The second term de-
notes the cost of fishing effort, which is the unit cost of cost effort, c, times units of
employed fishing effort, ei. The third term is the expected penalty of being caught,
which is the risk of being caught (Ψ) times the penalty, Ω. Note that we only con-
sider the case in which the quota is non-binding.
The two decision problems in equations (5) and (6) are solved by backward in-
duction, where we first solve the problem of the fishermen. This is done based on
information of the announced TAC regulation, the level of control effort, Z; and a
fixed penalty, Ω, where Z is the decision variable of the central authority. The fisher-
men of the two countries decide their fishing efforts in a non-cooperative Nash
game that produces a subgame perfect equilibrium. The fishermen have the incen-
tive to lower their fishing effort when the government increases the enforcement
effort. This follows since it is costly for the fishermen to be caught harvesting more
than the TAC. We assume a linear relation between the control effort and the risk of
being caught, denoted by Ψ = Z, where enforcement effort is denoted by Z and the
fishermen’s risk of being caught, Ψ. Secondly, the decision on the level of enforce-
ment is found for the central authority, which depends on the level of fishing effort
decided by the fishermen under all possible TACs.
Solving the fishermen game produces the non-cooperative effort levels, ei(o),
and profit levels, Pi(o), for the fishermen.
Optimal Fishing Effort of the Fishermen Facing a Centralised Authority
The maximisation problem of the fishermen is:
Max E p
Max ph ce h TAC
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In our case, the relevant objective to maximise is the case where catches are
above the TAC; that is, there is non-compliance (see above). The objective function
of the fishermen given non-compliance (upper equation) means that the fishermen
have an expected penalty of ΨΩ, and in addition to this, the expected value of the
catch (1 – Ψ)phi  is confiscated. We assume that the penalty Ω is exogenous and low.
Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) argue that courts often are reluctant to penalize over-
fishing significantly. The maximisation of this expression for both countries leads to
an equilibrium where the reaction functions of the fishermen to each other’s effort
























We see that higher catchability coefficient, q; lower intrinsic growth rate, r;
higher efficiency, b; and a larger number of fishermen imply a lower level of fishing
effort for an individual fisherman. The term b  equals c/[(1 – Ψ)pqK] if catches ex-Jensen and Lindroos 158
ceed the TAC. In the case of catches within the permitted range, the reaction func-
tions would be the same as equation (7), but with b = c/pqK. Note that we assume
that the EU sets the TAC so low that the fishermen are catching more than the TAC
in their non-cooperative equilibrium without control. Therefore, the relevant reac-
tion functions are given by equation (7) with b equalling c/[(1 – Ψ)pqK].














Optimal Control Effort of the Central Authority
The EU maximises the net present value of harvesting less the control costs:

















s.t. 0 ≤ Z ≤ 1.
The objective function of the EU does not include the penalties paid by fisher-
men (Ψphi + ΨΩ), because they are exactly offset by the income received by the EU
from the penalties.
The optimal control policy is found by taking the first order condition:
Z
cr








s.t. Z* ≥ 0.
It is clear that higher management costs imply a lower level of optimal enforce-
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A corner solution (no enforcement) will emerge when the enforcement costs are
sufficiently high. In this case, the central authority does not find it profitable to en-
force the fishery, since the additional value received from the fishery is less than the
enforcement costs necessary to achieve a lower fishing effort. From equation (10)
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From this expression we have that γ1 = (1/2b) + (1/2) =  ˆ γ. Therefore, the rela-























Here  ˆ γ denotes a critical level of unit enforcement cost above which enforce-
ment is not profitable. The critical level is higher for lower efficiency of the fishery
and vice versa.
Further, from equation (10) we see that increasing p and/or K leads to a higher
optimal enforcement effort. See the appendix for the proof. The intuition behind the
result is that if the resource is more valuable, the government has an increased in-
centive to monitor the exploitation. The effects of the remaining parameters are less
obvious and may depend on the parameters of the fishery.
PROPOSITION 1:  For higher unit enforcement costs γ1; lower price, p; and lower car-
rying capacity, K, of the fishery; the optimal enforcement effort level is always
lower. Further, there exists a critical level of unit enforcement costs,  ˆ γ, which de-
pends only on efficiency parameter b. If b is higher, then the critical level of unit
enforcement costs is lower and vice versa. If unit enforcement costs are higher than
ˆ γ, then the optimal enforcement effort is always zero.
Further, note that Z values greater than or equal to one are impossible, since we
assume that harvesting is profitable, for which it is necessary that b < 1 (see e.g.
Mesterton-Gibbons 1993). To prove this, let us denote the maximum control effort
by Z*
max = (2c2r)/(pqkcr + c2r). This is smaller than one only if b < 1.
PROPOSITION 2:  An optimal enforcement effort is strictly less than one, which follows
from the profitability condition b < 1.









since Z* < 1.
Management of the Fishery: The Case of Two Decentralised Authorities
(Competing Countries)
In the game between two decentralised authorities, the decision on the level of en-
forcement effort is based on considerations of strategy, benefit to the fishery, and
cost. This extends the problem of the single authority, which was purely based on
cost and benefit considerations. In the first stage of the game, each authority will
strategically let the level of enforcement depend on whether domestic or foreign
vessels are monitored. This does not mean that the authority will impose differentJensen and Lindroos 160
levels of enforcement over domestic and foreign vessels, rather that the authority
will let the level of enforcement effort depend on the share of domestic and foreign
vessels that are exploiting the fishery. In the second stage, the fishermen choose
their fishing efforts based on the control decisions of the two authorities. The game
is solved by backwards induction; that is, we first solve the second stage. After this,
the authorities can, in the first stage, compute their optimal control efforts.
We assume that the authority monitors the vessels randomly. This implies that if
75% of the vessels operating in the fishery are domestic, then 75% of the time, on
average, the authority monitors the domestic vessels. In other words, in the model
the decentralised authority is by assumption not allowed to employ all its enforce-
ment effort only to monitor the foreign vessels.
In our model, the decentralised authority monitors the fishing within its own
zone. The variable S measures time spent monitoring the domestic fishermen in the
national fishing zone. In this sense S = 1 implies that the national fishermen fish en-
tirely in the national zone, whereas S = 0.5 means that they only fish half of the time
in the national zone. The level of S is critical because it is crucial for the calculation
of the national income and thereby for the decentralised authority in the decision on
the level the enforcement effort.  In this sense, S = 1 means that the decentralised
authority only monitors the domestic fishermen because no foreign fishermen are
fishing in the zone, whereas S = 0 means that only foreign fishermen are monitored
because no domestic fleets fish in the zone. Note that we also assume that both
countries have fleets of an equal size to the same fraction operating in the domestic
zone.
We assume that the decentralised authority imposes similar management on do-
mestic and foreign fishermen. In this sense, an incentive for the local authority to
impose more severe control on foreign than domestic fishermen is not allowed in the
model.3 Secondly, the decision of the fishermen whether they want to fish in the do-
mestic or foreign fish zones is exogenous.
We assume that each country is responsible for the enforcement of its own na-
tional zone with the sum of unit enforcement costs γ2 (γi unit enforcement cost of
country i). This means that the country is handling the enforcement of both domestic
and foreign vessels within its zone. The fishermen game proceeds in a similar way
as in the previous section. The difference from the earlier analysis is now that the
efforts chosen by the fishermen in country i are also a function of the enforcement
policy of country j, since this policy affects the decision of the fleet competing
against the fishermen in country i. Thus, the government’s maximisation problem,
Zi, depends on Zj.
Optimal Fishing of the Fishermen Facing Decentralised Authorities
The expected profits of the fishermen in the case of illegal catches is now:
From zone  :  i pqSe x cSe cSe ii i i i () ( ) ( ) 1 −− + −− ΨΨ Ω (14a)
From zone  :  jp q S e x c S e c S e ji i j i ( ) () () () . 11 1 1 −− − − [] + −− − [] ΨΨ Ω (14b)
3 In the EU report on fisheries, it is noted that discrimination might be involved in the control of domes-
tic and foreign fishermen (see Report on Monitoring of the Common Fisheries Policy: Commission
document SEC (92) 394 final).Centralised vs. Decentralised Enforcement of Fish Quotas 161
The expected income of fishermen, i, can now be separated between the two
fishing zones that are the domestic and the foreign zones, respectively. The expected
profit of fishermen i of operating in the fishing zone is denoted in equation (14a),
where the first term is the expected income of non-compliance in the zone. The sec-
ond term is the expected term of compliance in zone i. The expected profit of
operating in zone j is likewise outlined in (14b). The total expected income of the
fishermen operating in both fishing zones is expressed in (14c), which follows by
adding (14a) with (14b).
Total E P S pqe x S pqe x ce ii i j i i i j () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). = − + −− − − + 11 1 ΨΨ Ψ Ψ Ω (14c)
The reaction functions of the fishermen are now a modified version of equation
(9) above (see appendix for derivation):
e
q











































− + −− [] () ( ) ()
,
11 1 ΨΨ
which is the efficiency parameter showing how profitable the fishery is.
The result is that we have two opposite effects, which are shown in equation
(16). The first effect implies that an increase in the enforcement from country i will
decrease potential income and thereby decreases effort in country i. The second ef-
fect is half of the magnitude of the first effect and is given by the last term of equation
(16). According to the second effect, an increased enforcement effort from the foreign
state means a decreased fishing effort by foreign fishermen, and this means that the do-
mestic fishermen will increase their fishing effort (given that S ∈ [0.5, 1]).
Optimal Control Effort of the Decentralised Authorities
We will compare two cases. The first case is S = 0.5, where half of the fishing effort
of the domestic fleet is directed to the foreign zone. The second, S = 1, is the case
where all domestic vessels harvest within the domestic zone and where each country
controls its own vessels.
The countries then maximise the following:
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Since ei is a function of ej and Zj, Zi is also a function of these. In the following,
the subgame perfect equilibria are solved (see the derivation of implicit reaction
functions in the appendix).
The case where S = 0.5 leads to bi = bj, since half of the enforcement of the fish-
ermen comes from the home country and half from the foreign country.
Differentiating equation (17) with respect to Zi leads to first-order conditions and a






























The solution of the two-player game when S = 0.5 looks very much like the so-
lution to the one-player game and may even coincide if the control costs of the
Member State are low enough.
Comparing the EU optimum Z* [equation (9)] and the non-cooperative equilib-
rium with S = 0.5 shows that whether the EU optimum Z* is higher than the




























Thus, for any given fishery parameters when S = 0.5 and γ1 = γ2, the difference
between the EU optimum and the non-cooperative control game between two Mem-
ber States depends only on enforcement costs. Further, if the Member States are
exactly 50% more efficient in controlling the fishery, the solutions are identical
since expression (19) then equals zero.
PROPOSITION 3:  When S = 0.5 (meaning that half of the enforcement effort is directed
towards domestic and the other half towards foreign fishermen), the decentralised
enforcement game has a lower equilibrium enforcement level than the EU optimal
enforcement if the enforcement costs are equal. If the Member States have 50%
lower enforcement costs, then the equilibrium enforcement is higher than the EU en-
forcement level.
Let us next proceed to the other case where S = 1. Here we see that bi is only a
function of Zi since enforcement only affects domestic fishermen. Differentiating






























We have that the enforcement effort, Z, must be lower in the case when S = 1.
Given that there is no enforcement cost difference between the EU and the two-Centralised vs. Decentralised Enforcement of Fish Quotas 163
country cases, we can also state that enforcement effort in the two-player case when
S = 1 is lower than in the EU case.
Comparing the solutions with Z* – Zi
S=1 (equal enforcement costs) yields a condi-











If inequality (21) is not satisfied, then clearly this is a violation of condition
(13). This means that if condition (21) holds, enforcement effort is larger in the EU
case than in the non-cooperative game between two countries that both enforce their
own fishermen (S = 1).
Numerical Example
We use the following numerical example to illustrate the main results based on the
model developed in previous three sections.
For the sake of comparison, the results outlined in table 1 are normalised, which
means that the results for the EU case are set to unity so that numerical figures for
other incidents can be directly compared numerically. This means, for example, that
a 0.94 enforcement effort implies a 6% reduction in the enforcement effort com-
pared to the case of EU enforcement.
The cases of one central authority (EU) and decentralised enforcement under-
taken by two countries are outlined in the table. In the case of decentralised
enforcement, we calculate different numerical values depending on the values for S
and γ. The enforcement cost for the EU is set to γ1. For the decentralised authorities,
we simulate two cases. In the first case, the enforcement cost of the decentralised
authorities is 25% less than the enforcement cost of the EU. In the second case, we
Table 1
Overview of the Results following the Cases of Centralised
and Decentralised Enforcement (EU, Member State)
Fishing Effort/ Expected Fishermen
Enforcement Steady-state Government Profit/Enforcement
Effort Stock/Harvest Surplus Costs
EU 1 1/1/1 1 1/1
No Enforcement 0 1.52/0.22/0.33 –0.25 0/0
Two Countries
S = 0.5 γ1 > γ2 0.94 1.13/0.81/0.91 0.92 0.93/0.57
γ1 = γ2 0.85 1.23/0.65/0.80 0.53 0.84/0.55
S = 1 γ1 > γ2 0.67 1.37/0.46/0.62 0.39 0.69/0.23
γ1 = γ2 0.56 1.40/0.39/0.55 0.13 0.44/0.22
Parameter values: γ1 = 2 and γ2 = 1.5 when γ1 > γ2; otherwise γ1 = γ2 = 1.5.
Other parameter values:  p = 1, r = 0.8, K = 100, q = 0.8, c = 7, Ω = 0.22.Jensen and Lindroos 164
assume that the enforcement costs of the EU and decentralised authorities are equal.
For the share of national fishermen, S, we employ two values S = 0.5 and S = 1,
which imply that the proportion of domestic fishermen is 50% and 100% of the total
population of monitored fishermen, respectively.
A general result that is seen in the table is that it is Pareto optimal to leave the
competence to enforce the fishery to the EU. This follows because both the govern-
ment and the fishermen will be better off in terms of government surplus and profits
for the fishermen. The result depends critically on the level of enforcement cost, and
we have assumed that the cost advantage of decentralised enforcement is 25% of the
cost of EU enforcement. However, as indicated in the previous section, a cost ad-
vantage of 50% is needed to secure that the enforcement effort is at the same level
in the EU cooperative case and in the two-country, non-cooperative game. Note,
however, that for achieving a welfare gain, an efficiency difference of strictly less
than 50% is sufficient. This is because the enforcement effort is the same when the
cost difference is 50%, and clearly the countries are then strictly better off in the
non-cooperative game as compared with the EU case. Therefore, a smaller cost dif-
ference is sufficient to make the countries indifferent between the choice of
centralised and decentralised enforcement.
Another result revealed by the simulations is that under a regime of no enforce-
ment, the profits of the fishermen are zero. This follows from the results of familiar
literature on open access fishery (Mesterton-Gibbons 1993). In addition to this, we
see that under open access, the government has a negative surplus because we as-
sume that the government has some fixed management cost.
When looking at enforcement effort, assuming the enforcement cost of the EU
and decentralised states are the same γ1 = γ2, it is seen that the enforcement effort of
the decentralised states varies between 56% and 85% of the effort employed by the
EU. This follows because in the non-cooperative solution, the countries are only
concerned about their national income, and the obtained equilibrium is a typical ex-
ample of the tragedy of the commons. The negative externality problem is less
severe when there are also foreign fishermen in the national zones (S = 0.5). This is
because the countries then have more incentive to increase their enforcement levels,
thereby decreasing their foreign fishing effort in the domestic zone. It is also inter-
esting to note that although there is only a minor difference in the enforcement
effort, there will be a dramatic difference in the obtained surplus to the government,
only 53% and 13% relative to the cooperative game for S = 0.5 and S = 1, respec-
tively. The reason is that the fishermen employ much more fishing effort in the
non-cooperative game, and as they do so, there will be fewer harvests and the stock
level will be smaller. The expected profits of the fishermen are not affected dramati-
cally, as was the case with government surplus. This is because less enforcement
effort also means a lower probability of being caught illegally harvesting. The
fishermen’s expected profits are 84% and 44% of the EU case for S = 0.5 and S =1,
respectively.
For cases where enforcement cost differs between the EU and the Member
States, γ1  > γ2, the enforcement effort of the decentralised states is 67% and 94%,
respectively, of the EU effort level. Moreover, the surplus of the government and the
expected profits of the fishermen are higher than for the case of equal enforcement
costs. This follows because the 25% reduction in the enforcement cost of the
decentralised states implies a more cost-efficient enforcement that allows the coun-
tries to monitor their fishing zone with less cost.
When comparing the income of the fishermen under centralised and
decentralised enforcement, we extend the discussion to the possibility of the cost re-
covery of enforcement costs, as emphasised by Arnason, Hannesson, and Schrank
(2000), OECD (2003), and Andersen and Sutinen (2003). The cost recovery con-Centralised vs. Decentralised Enforcement of Fish Quotas 165
cerns the extent to which it is possible that the users of the resource cover some of
the enforcement costs. In this respect, the government might charge the fishermen
for participating in the fishery. This implies that if the fishermen obtain a higher
profit under a regime of high enforcement effort than under a regime of less effort,
the regulator could use this difference in the fishermen’s profits as an argument for
requiring the fishermen to finance some of the enforcement cost. In considering the
possibility of cost recovery, we look at the expected profit of the fishermen. In table
1 it is outlined that cost recovery is possible under decentralised enforcement. For
example, when S = 1, assuming that enforcement cost is γ1 = γ2, by requiring the
fishermen pay the 1% cost difference, we move to a situation when γ1 > γ2, and the
expected profits of the fishermen increase from 44% to 69% of the EU solution.
However, the fishermen cannot afford to pay the difference between centralised
and decentralised enforcement costs in any of the cases. This is due to the high costs
of enforcing the cooperative solution. For example, with the enforcement cost dif-
ference and S = 0.5, the non-cooperative game produces nearly as much government
surplus (92%) and expected fishermen profit (93%), but at a much lower cost (57%).
A limitation of the present model is that it is static, which implies that the cost of
excess fishing capacity in a dynamic context is not addressed. By allowing capacity
dynamics, cost recovery induces taxation that would impact fishing capacity. This
might prove to be the right context to evaluate the impact of cost recovery. In the
present static context, the simulations indicate that complete cost recovery is not ob-
tained.
Discussion
In the management of international shared resources, economic rents are obtained by
coordinating the exploitation of the resources. The management of fishery resources in
the EU is an interesting case of international cooperation because the Member States
have committed principal elements of the conservation policy to the federal level.
Sutinen and Andersen (1985) emphasise that essential elements in the manage-
ment of a regulated industry are implementation and enforcement. Enforcement is
essential in order to ensure that imposed regulations are not neglected. The present
article has addressed the employment of enforcement policy in an international con-
text. We have focused on whether the management of enforcement should be
conducted at the centralised (federal) or decentralised (regional) level. This has been
accomplished by the use of a two-country model that describes the enforcement of
international shared resources.
The result indicates that a welfare gain is obtained under centralised enforce-
ment at the federal level. The result depends critically on the level of enforcement
costs at the federal and the Member State (regional) levels. If the Member States
have a sufficiently large cost advantage in enforcing fishing quotas, then welfare
gains under decentralised enforcement could be obtained. In addition, the result de-
pends on the proportion of foreign fishermen in the domestic fishing zone. The
higher the proportion of foreign fishermen in the domestic zone, the better
decentralised enforcement of quotas is compared to centralised enforcement.
The results are derived in a game theoretical setting by comparing cooperative
and non-cooperative solutions. The cooperative solution is obtained under federal
enforcement, where overall welfare is maximised. The non-cooperative solution fol-
lows under decentralised enforcement, where the level of enforcement is based on
individual optimisation. The latter case implies that setting a sustainable TAC is not
sufficient to avoid an overexploitation of the resources. The reason is that the man-
agement of enforcement is decided strategically.Jensen and Lindroos 166
The fact that it is relatively expensive to undertake enforcement in the fishery is
an important reason that many states are reluctant to undertake sufficient manage-
ment of enforcement. If the Member State level is the most cost efficient one
through which to conduct enforcement management, a higher level of enforcement
could be achieved using a federal level subsidy. An advantage to this is that the effi-
ciency gain of enforcement is realised. Federal subsidising of enforcement by
Member States is actually employed as part of the EU fishery policy.4 Our model
has shown that these subsidies may be justified in two cases. The first case is when
there is a large proportion of domestic fishermen in the Member States’ fishing zone
(high S). In this case, it is clear that subsidising enforcement costs would help to de-
crease the problem of the commons by increasing control effort but leaving the level
of control costs practically unchanged. The second case in which EU subsidies
would be appropriate is where the control costs are very high. Enforcement subsi-
dies might induce a change from no enforcement to a reasonable degree of
enforcement and, thus, higher economic viability of the fishery.
Another way that the Member State could obtain funds to finance their fishery
management is through user payment. The fishermen as the main user group of the
fishery resources could be charged for the enforcement. This is called cost recovery
and has been employed in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The use of cost re-
covery has not been considered in the EU, but opens up some interesting dimensions
in the present analysis. The implications of employing a user charge at the Member
State and federal levels should be studied in the future.
A further EU policy that would seem reasonable would be to allow fishermen to
harvest in the waters of a foreign Member State. This would reduce the problem of
non-cooperative behaviour (national interests) by decreasing S, the proportion of do-
mestic fishermen. Following the model, a decrease in S would give a higher level of
enforcement than the case where the proportion of domestic fishermen is high.
The current article has also opened a number of avenues for further research.
The tradeoff between complete compliance and costly enforcement could be studied,
taking several features into account. First, the asymmetry between countries and
fishermen could be analysed when countries have different fleet sizes and cost struc-
tures. Second, the effect of cooperation among more than two countries and possibly
even groups of Member States could be studied. Finally, the problem could be stud-
ied in a dynamic setting.
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Appendix
Derivation of equation (7): Fishermen’s Reaction Functions of the EU Case
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Derivation of equation (9): The Interior Optimum in the EU Case
max ( )
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From this equation we can solve for optimal enforcement effort Z* by multiplying all
through by (1 – Z)3.
Effect of Price and Carrying Capacity
∂Z*/∂p > 0 if qKcr – q2Kγ1 > 0. This holds if γ1 < cr/q. However, Z* = 0 if (2c2r)/
(pqKcr + c2r – γ1) > 1, and this condition is always satisfied if γ1 ≥ cr/q. Therefore, it
is always true that ∂Z*/∂p > 0. Analogous proof for K.
Derivation of equation (15): Fishermen’s Reaction Functions of the Two-
player Case
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Derivation of equation (18): Countries’ Reaction Functions and Equilibrium
of the Two-player Case when S = 0.5
max ( )
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Derivation of equation (20): Countries’ Reaction Functions and Equilibrium
of the Two-player Case when S = 1
max ( )
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